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CORNEA AND INDUCTIVE EVIDENCE
Justin P. McBrayer
One of the primary tools in the theist's defense against "noseeum" arguments 
from evil is an epistemic principle concerning the Conditions Of ReasoNable 
Epistemic Access (CORNEA) which places an important restriction on what 
counts as evidence. However, CORNEA is false because it places too strong a 
condition on what counts as inductive evidence. If CORNEA is true, we lack 
evidence for a great many of our inductive beliefs. This is because CORNEA 
amounts to a sensitivity constraint on evidence, and inductive evidence is of­
ten insensitive. So unless a theist is also an inductive skeptic, she must aban­
don CORNEA in responding to this sort of argument from evil.
A noseeum argument from evil is one that enlists the fact that we see no 
compensating good for some evil as inductive evidence for the claim that 
there is no such compensating good for that evil.1 One of the primary tools 
in the theist's defense against such arguments is an epistemic principle 
concerning the Conditions Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access (CORNEA):
CORNEA: On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled 
to claim "It appears that p" only if it is reasonable for H to 
believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she 
has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be 
different than it is in some way discernible by her.* 2
CORNEA has been ably defended by Stephen Wykstra3 and has been ac­
cepted by at least some parties on either side of the debate over the sound­
ness of noseeum arguments from evil.4 The principle places an important 
restriction on what counts as evidence, and it is used to undermine a key
4The name is due to Stephen Wykstra, "Rowe's Noseeum Arguments from Evil," 
in The Evidential Argument from  Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 126-150.
2Stephen Wykstra, "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from 
Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance,'" International Journal for  
Philosophy o f Religion 16 (1984), p. 85.
3Wykstra, "The Humean Obstacle"; Wykstra, "Rowe's Noseeum Arguments"; 
Stephen Wykstra, "CORNEA, Carnap, and Current Closure Befuddlement," Faith 
and Philosophy 24.1 (2007), pp. 87-98; and Bruce Russell and Stephen Wykstra, 
"The 'Inductive' Argument from Evil: A Dialogue," Philosophical Topics 16 (1988), 
pp. 133-160.
4E.g., William Rowe, "Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis: A Response to Wykstra," 
International Journal for Philosophy o f Religion 16 (1984), pp. 95-100.
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premise in noseeum arguments from evil.5 CORNEA has been recently 
criticized both in this journal and elsewhere.6 However, CORNEA is subject 
to a much more serious criticism than any previously levied: If CORNEA 
is true, we lack evidence for many of our inductive beliefs as CORNEA 
places too strong a restriction on what counts as evidence. This is because 
CORNEA amounts to a sensitivity constraint on evidence, and oftentimes 
our evidence is not suitably sensitive to the facts (where some fact A is sensi­
tive to fact B just in case were B not the case, A would not be the case). What 
follows is a quick review of CORNEA's relevance for noseeum arguments 
from evil (§1), an exegesis showing that CORNEA amounts to a sensitivity 
constraint on evidence (§2), and an argument that CORNEA has false im­
plications for the epistemic status of many of our inductive beliefs (§3).
1. CORNEA and Noseeum Arguments from Evil
Why does it matter whether or not CORNEA is true? The short answer is 
because the principle underlies a principal objection to noseeum argu­
ments from evil, and noseeum arguments from evil represent one of the most 
common contemporary forms of the argument from evil. Abandoning the 
attempt to demonstrate that the existence of evil was logically incompatible 
with the existence of God (the so-called logical problem of evil), philosophers 
such as Rowe7 insist that the existence of evil nevertheless provides strong 
evidence against the existence of God (the so-called evidential problem of 
evil).8 On this version of the argument from evil, the existence of evil won't 
count as evidence against the existence of God unless the evil is gratuitous, 
viz. evil that is not necessary to secure some compensating good or necessary 
to avert some greater evil.9 A simplified sketch of the argument is as follows:
5In its initial form, CORNEA was intended as a restriction on evidence simplic- 
iter, though later discussion suggests that CORNEA serves only as a restriction 
on "levering evidence" where levering evidence is evidence that is epistemically 
powerful enough to move a rational person from one square belief state to an­
other (e.g., from disbelief to non-belief or from non-belief to belief). See Wykstra, 
"Rowe's Noseeum Arguments," pp. 130-131. My criticism will apply to either 
reading of 'evidence,' and I argue this in §3.
6For example, it has been argued that CORNEA is too weak to block the argu­
ment from evil since the principle applies only if it is logically necessary that evil 
appears gratuitous (Keith Chrzan, "Debunking CORNEA," International Journal for  
Philosophy o f Religion 21 (1987), pp. 171-177), that CORNEA falsely implies that we 
are always able to grasp complex subjunctive conditionals (Daniel Howard-Snyder, 
"Seeing Through CORNEA," International Journal for Philosophy o f Religion 32 [1992], 
pp. 25-79), and that CORNEA violates closure (Andrew Graham and Stephen 
Maitzen, "CORNEA and Closure," Faith and Philosophy 24:1 (2007), 83-86).
^William Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American 
Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), pp. 335-341.
8The classic example of the so-called logical problem of evil is J. L. Mackie, 
"Evil and Omnipotence," Mind 64 (1955), pp. 200-212. The classic theistic response 
to the so-called logical problem of evil is Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1974).
9This point is widely conceded. For example, Rowe ("The Problem of Evil," p. 
335) writes that "Intense human or animal suffering is in itself bad, an evil, even
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(1) If God exits, then there are no gratuitous evils.
(2) At least some evils are gratuitous.
So, (3) God does not exist.10 *
(1) is defended by appeal to God's omnipotence and omnibenevolence. 
A wholly good God would not allow evil that he could prevent unless 
doing so was necessary for some greater good or for averting some evil 
equally as bad or worse.11 As for premise (2), we have reason to think that 
a particular evil is gratuitous only if we have reason to think that the evil 
in question does not secure some compensating good, so (2) is defended 
as follows:
(4) If there is no compensating good for some evil, then that evil is 
gratuitous.
(5) There are no compensating goods for at least some evils.
So, (2) At least some evils are gratuitous.
(4) is true by definition. Proponents of so-called noseeum arguments from 
evil defend (5) by appeal to an appears-claim: it often appears as if there 
are no compensating goods for some evils that we know about. For ex­
ample, Rowe asks us to consider the case of a fawn that is burned to death 
in a wildfire:
So far as we can see, the fawn's intense suffering is pointless. For there 
does not appear to be any greater good such that the prevention of the 
fawn's suffering would require either the loss of that good or the oc­
currence of an evil equally bad or worse. Nor does there seem to be any 
equally bad or worse evil so connected to the fawn's suffering that it 
would have had to occur had the fawn's suffering been prevented.12
According to the proponent of the noseeum argument from evil, our not 
seeing any compensating good in cases like these is a prima facie reason to
though it may sometimes be justified by virtue of being a part of, or leading to, 
some good which is unobtainable without it."
10For example, here is Rowe's ("The Problem of Evil," p. 336) version of the 
argument:
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, om­
niscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some 
greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence 
of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without 
thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad 
or worse.
3. :. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
uFor a rebuttal of premise (1), see Peter van Inwagen, The Problem o f Evil (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006).
12Rowe, "The Problem of Evil," p. 337 (emphasis mine).
think that there is no compensating good; thus premise (5) is true, and the 
argument from evil goes through.
CORNEA is invoked to show that the fact that there appears to be no 
compensating good does not provide any reason to think that there re­
ally is no compensating good (or, alternatively, to dispute the truth of the 
appears-claim in question-m ore on the mechanics of this move below). 
This leaves premise (5) undefended. And without a reason to think that at 
least some evils in the world really are gratuitous, the noseeum argument 
from evil is left without a defense of its minor premise. For this reason, it 
is important to see whether CORNEA is susceptible to the criticism levied 
against it here.
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2. CORNEA and Sensitivity
Here is the original formulation of the principle once again:
CORNEA: On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled 
to claim "It appears that p" only if it is reasonable for H to 
believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she 
has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be 
different than it is in some way discernible by her.13
Some exegesis of the principle is necessary to make the case that CORNEA 
is a sensitivity constraint. First, a 'cognized situation' is anything that 
can serve as evidence (e.g., a perceptual experience, a belief, a seeming 
state, etc.).
Second, Wykstra uses 'appears' in an epistemically-loaded sense. Since 
at least Chisholm14 it has been recognized that appearance words like 'ap­
pears,' 'looks,' 'see,' etc. are ambiguous. For example, these words can be 
used in a phenomenological/ perceptual sense as in 'the table looks brown 
to me' or 'I see the dog.' Appearance words can also be used in a metaphor­
ical or cognitive sense as in 'I see that the argument is valid' or 'it appears 
that the war in Iraq is going badly.' There is also an epistemically-loaded 
sense in which the appearance claim constitutes prima facie evidence for 
some belief, and it is this sense of 'appears' that is relevant for CORNEA.
The use of a technical sense of 'appears' makes the role of CORNEA in 
the dialectic between Rowe and Wykstra confusing. Where 'e' stands for 
some particular evil, Wykstra illustrates the dialectic as follows:
(A) We see no good for which God would allow e.
(B) There appears to be no good for which God allows e.
(C) There is no good for which God allows e.15
Wykstra claims that Rowe uses (A) to support (B) and moves from (B) to 
(C) via the principle of credulity (roughly, the principle that if it appears 
that P, then it is reasonable to believe that P). Since Wykstra accepts (A) and
13Wykstra, "The Humean Obstacle," p. 85.
14R. M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1957).
15Wykstra, "Rowe's Noseeum Arguments," p. 127.
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accepts the principle of credulity, he seeks to block the move from (A) to 
(B) by imposing the CORNEA restriction on appears claims. However, it 
doesn't much matter if the evidential restriction is placed on the move from 
(A) to (B) or the move from (B) to (C). It is much simpler to agree with Rowe 
that it appears (in the cognitive sense) that there are no compensating goods 
for some evils but insist that this cognitive state doesn't provide evidence 
for the belief that there are no compensating goods unless the requirement 
imposed by CORNEA is met. Thus understood, CORNEA is a restriction 
on when any "cognized situation" counts as evidence. Wykstra concedes as 
much: "the key idea behind CORNEA is a proposed test for whether some 
alleged evidence E seriously 'supports' . . . some hypothesis H."16
Third, Wykstra clarifies the subjunctive conditional in the consequent 
of CORNEA as follows:
CORNEA says that a situation of seeing no X justifies one's claiming 
"it appears there is no X" only if it is reasonable for one to believe 
that X is something to which we would likely have "epistemic ac­
cess" in the situation.17
Since this is the epistemically charged sense of 'appears,' the gist is that 
the fact that it appears to me that P will count as evidence for P only if it 
is reasonable for me to believe that a certain counterfactual is true: were 
it not the case that P, my cognized situation would likely be different 
than it is.
This counterfactual restriction amounts to a kind of sensitivity restric­
tion on evidence. Here is a standard sensitivity condition for belief (where 
'Bp' stands for the belief that p):
Bp is sensitive only if [ ~p □ ^  ~Bp]
A subject S's belief that P is sensitive only if were P not the case, then S 
would not believe that P.18 CORNEA is not a sensitivity condition on be­
lief but on evidence. Additionally, standard sensitivity conditions entail the 
truth of a particular counterfactual: If a subject S's belief that P is sensitive, 
then the subjunctive conditional 'if P were not the case, then S would not 
believe that P' is true. But CORNEA lacks this entailment: All that is re­
quired to meet the necessary condition in CORNEA is that it be reasonable 
for the subject to believe that the subjunctive conditional is true (it might 
actually be false). The CORNEA condition might be sketched as follows:
A subject S's cognitive situation C is evidence for P only if it is reason­
able for S to believe that [~P □ ^  C is discernibly different]
According to CORNEA, while it's not the case that the evidence must ac­
tually be sensitive to the facts, it must be reasonable for the subject to
16Wykstra, "CORNEA, Carnap," p. 88.
17Wykstra, "Rowe's Noseeum Arguments," p. 128.
18The contrapositive of sensitivity is the safety condition: Bp is safe only if [ Bp 
p]. Note that the safety and sensitivity conditions are not logically equivalent 
because contraposition is not valid for subjunctive conditionals.
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believe that the evidence is sensitive to the facts. If this belief is not reason­
able, then the cognized situation in question won't serve as evidence for 
the proposition in question. In this way, CORNEA amounts to a kind of 
sensitivity requirement on evidence.
It is now easy to apply this formulation to concrete cases. Consider my 
belief that my computer is on. I believe this because it appears to me that 
my computer is on. This appearance state counts as evidence for my belief 
that my computer is on because it is reasonable for me to believe that if my 
computer were off, then my appearance state would be discernibly differ­
ent. My evidence in this case meets the CORNEA requirement.
Why think that CORNEA is true? Well, on the face of it, CORNEA is 
plausible. Here is the case used by Wykstra to demonstrate its plausibility:
Searching for a table, you look through a doorway. The room is very 
large-say, the size of a Concord hangar—and it is filled with bull­
dozers, dead elephants, Toyotas, and other vision-obstructing objects. 
Surveying this clutter from the doorway, and seeing no table, should 
you say: "It does not appear that there is a table in the room"?19
Is the fact that you see no table evidence for the claim 'there are no tables 
in the room'? No. CORNEA explains why: it is not reasonable for you to 
believe that-given  your cognitive faculties and the use you have made of 
them—were there actually a table in the room, your perceptual experience 
would be any different.
It is obvious how CORNEA undermines the noseeum argument from 
evil. If CORNEA is true, then the atheist's case for (5) falls apart. Recall 
that (5) is defended by appeal to a cognitive appearance state: we don't see 
any compensating goods for some evils. Rowe's original case involved a 
suffering fawn. Wykstra notes that the fawn case doesn't pass CORNEA:
On the basis of his seeing no God-justifying good served by the fawn's 
suffering, Rowe is entitled to claim "It appears that there is no such 
good" only if it is reasonable for Rowe to believe that, given his cogni­
tive faculties and the use he has made of them, if the fawn's suffering 
served such a good, he would likely see (have epistemic access to) it.20
It is plausible that it's not reasonable for any of us to believe that-given  
our limited cognitive faculties and the use we have made of them—things 
would seem any different to us even if there were compensating goods 
for all of the evils on earth. We're just not that perspicacious. It's plausible 
that a great many compensating goods would be outside of our ken. And 
so the fact that it appears to us that there are no compensating goods for 
some evils does not provide evidence for the claim that there are no com­
pensating goods for some evils.21 Premise (5) is left undefended.
19Wykstra, "The Humean Obstacle," p. 84.
20Ibid., p. 85.
21Again, as originally proposed, the CORNEA strategy provides a way to deny 
what I claim here is a fact, namely, that it appears to us that there are no com­
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3. CORNEA and Inductive Evidence
The objection that I wish to raise against CORNEA can be stated very 
simply. As shown above, CORNEA amounts to a sensitivity restriction on 
evidence, and much of our inductive evidence is not suitably sensitive. 
Granting that this insensitive evidence still counts as evidence in favor of 
the propositions in question (an assumption all non-skeptics should be 
happy to grant), this implies that CORNEA is false.
Epistemologists have long flirted with sensitivity requirements on 
knowledge, justification, etc.22 What I wish to show is that the sorts of 
problems that plague earlier sensitivity accounts of knowledge, justifica­
tion, etc. also plague CORNEA.23 In particular, our inductive evidence is 
rarely sensitive to the facts in the fashion required by CORNEA. Consider 
each of the following cases:
Case 1: Though I hold a ticket, I believe that I will lose the lottery. I have 
inductive evidence for this claim. I know that the odds of win­
ning are one in a million. Is my evidence sensitive to the fact that 
I will lose the lottery? No. Go to the closest world in which I win. 
I just get lucky and pull the right ticket. Is it reasonable for me to 
believe that my cognitive situation in the actual world would be 
discernibly different from my cognitive situation in the possible 
world in which I win? No—things would look just the same to 
me. So, according to CORNEA, my cognized situation in this 
case is not evidence for the claim that I will lose the lottery.
Case 2: I believe that my son Patrick is asleep. I have inductive evi­
dence for this claim. I know that it is now 3:00 and that my son 
almost always naps from 2:00-4:00. Is my evidence sensitive to 
the fact that my son is asleep? No. Go to the closest world in 
which my son is not asleep. Perhaps he ate spicy food for lunch, 
or perhaps my wife took him out on a last-minute errand, or 
perhaps he's just not sleepy. Is my cognitive situation in the ac­
tual world discernibly different from my cognitive situation in 
the possible world in which Patrick is not asleep? No—things 
would look just the same to me. So, according to CORNEA, I 
have no evidence for the claim that my son is asleep.
Case 3: I believe that all crows are black. I have inductive evidence for 
this claim. All the crows I've seen (and I've seen a lot!) have
pensating goods for some evils. Thanks to a perspicacious referee for Faith and 
Philosophy for pointing this out. But as I argue in §2, it doesn't much matter whether 
the CORNEA restriction is placed on what counts as an appearance (where this 
is used in a technical, epistemic sense) or on when an appearance counts as evi­
dence. I use the latter in order to avoid the confusion that ensues from using a 
non-standard sense of 'appears.'
22For example, see Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 172-185.
23For an example of a criticism of a sensitivity requirement on knowledge, see 
Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 147-163.
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been black. Is my evidence sensitive to the fact that all crows 
are black? No. Go to the closest world in which it is false that 
all crows are black. Perhaps a crow suffers from a gene mix-up 
that causes him to be an albino. Is it reasonable to believe that 
my cognitive situation in the actual world would be discernibly 
different from my cognitive situation in the possible world in 
which not all crows are black? No—things would look just the 
same to me. So, according to CORNEA, I have no evidence for 
the claim that all crows are black.
In each case, it is not reasonable for me to believe that my cognitive situa­
tion would be discernibly different in the closest world in which the claim 
in question is false. In fact, quite the opposite is true: I know full-well 
that my cognitive situation would look the very same to me in the closest 
world in which the claim in question is false. But CORNEA requires that 
for my cognitive situation to have any epistemic potency, it must be rea­
sonable for me to believe that my cognitive situation would be discernibly 
different in the closest world in which the claim in question is false. So, ac­
cording to CORNEA, my cognitive situation in each case is epistemically 
impotent. Put in the "appears" locution of the original CORNEA: I am 
not entitled to claim that it appears to me that I will lose the lottery. I am 
not entitled to claim that it appears to me that my son Patrick is asleep. I 
am not entitled to claim that it appears to me that all crows are black. But, 
intuitively, I am entitled to claim all these things. My belief that I will lose 
the lottery is justified for me because of my inductive evidence. The same 
goes for case 2 and 3. CORNEA gives us the wrong answer in each case. If 
so, then—unless we want to be skeptics about inductive justification—we 
should conclude that CORNEA is false. Note that this objection is not 
based on a mere technicality but an important fact: humans have serious 
cognitive limitations. Our evidence is not counterfactually dependent on 
facts in the strong way required by a sensitivity constraint. We have to 
make our way through the world with evidence that is good enough de­
spite the fact that it could be better in a number of ways.
An immediate objection to my portrayal of CORNEA and argument 
against it is that I have focused on a straw man. In its initial formulation, 
CORNEA was intended as a restriction against evidence simpliciter, but 
in more recent formulations, Wykstra has limited the scope of CORNEA 
to what he calls "levering" evidence.24 Evidence is levering when it war­
rants a belief revision from what Wykstra calls "one square state" to an­
other. For example, if evidence warrants a change from square disbelief 
to square non-belief or from square non-belief to square belief, it is lever­
ing evidence. On this construal of CORNEA, it is not true that CORNEA 
implies that I have no evidence in cases 1-3 but only that I have no lever­
ing evidence in 1-3.25
24Wykstra, "Rowe's Noseeum Arguments."
25This objection is due to an anonymous referee for Faith and Philosophy. The 
objection can also be lodged using the terminology from Wykstra, "CORNEA, 
Carnap": evidential support may be static or dynamic (where levering evidence is 
dynamic), and CORNEA is a regulation only on dynamic support. The reformu­
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However, this restriction in the scope of CORNEA does not avoid the 
criticism. Each of the aforementioned cases can be restructured so that 
it's clear that the inductive evidence is levering evidence. For example, 
imagine that in case 1 I am given a lottery ticket in ignorance of how many 
tickets are sold. Perhaps I have the only ticket, or perhaps there are a mil­
lion others. Being rational, I withhold belief concerning the proposition 
that I will win the lottery. Later I learn that the odds of winning are one 
in a million. Based on this new information, I disbelieve that I will win 
the lottery. My cognitive situation in this case warrants a belief revision 
from non-belief to disbelief. The evidence is therefore levering evidence. 
However, it remains irrational for me to believe the required subjunctive 
conditional: I know full well that my cognitive situation would be exactly 
the same in the closest world in which I win the lottery. And so according 
to the evidence-levering restriction on CORNEA, my cognitive situation 
does not warrant the revision from non-belief to disbelief. And so even on 
the restricted reading, CORNEA is false.
This criticism also applies to a re-formulated version of CORNEA due 
to Daniel Howard-Snyder. Anticipating a radical skepticism variety of the 
objection raised here, Howard-Snyder proposes the following emended 
principle that he calls CORNEA*:
On the basis of what she has to go on, H is entitled to infer p from 'so 
far as I can tell, p' only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given 
her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were 
not the case in relevant alternative situations, what she had to go on in 
claiming 'so far as I can tell, p' would probably be different than it is 
in some way discernible by her.26
CORNEA* differs from CORNEA by restricting the antecedent of the sub­
junctive condition to relevant alternatives. The conditions under which 
a given alternative counts as relevant is a matter of contention, but the 
restriction is usually introduced to rule out skeptical scenarios like being a 
brain in a vat. If this is the proper restriction, then the paradigm cases re­
viewed above also show that CORNEA* is false. This is because my son's 
not taking a nap is certainly a relevant possibility for me. Since I see no 
other way of drawing the distinction between what is relevant and what 
is not in a way that is not ad hoc, I conclude that it is at least often the case 
that our inductive evidence fails CORNEA*.
If CORNEA is false, what accounts for its initial plausibility? Here I can 
only offer a suggestion. In virtually every instance in which an example is 
offered on behalf of CORNEA, the example uses an appears claim that is 
perceptual in nature.27 For example, my not seeing any tables in the clut­
tered hangar is not evidence for there not being any tables in the cluttered
lated case that I sketch also shows that inductive evidence is often dynamic de­
spite the fact that it fails CORNEA.
26Howard-Snyder, "Seeing Through CORNEA," p. 36 (emphasis mine).
27See Wykstra, "The Humean Obstacle," pp. 84-86; Russell and Wykstra, "The 
'Inductive' Argument," p. 143; Wykstra, "Rowe's Noseeum Arguments," p. 126; 
and Wykstra, "CORNEA, Carnap," p. 88.
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hangar because even if there were a table there, my perceptual experience 
would be the same. The same goes for seeing fleas on a dog, germs in 
a room, and viruses on a needle. So perhaps something like CORNEA 
is true when restricted to perceptual appearances but not as applied to 
metaphorical appearances. In fact, so restricted, the CORNEA principle 
looks very much like a necessary condition that Dretske places on primary 
epistemic seeing in his classic work Seeing and Knowing. A case of primary 
epistemic seeing is a case in which one's perceiving that P is sufficient for 
knowing that P. The necessary condition of interest here is as follows:
S sees that b is P in a primary epistemic way only if the conditions
under which S sees b are such that b would not look the way it now
looks to S unless it was P.28
Dretske argues that this restriction provides the perceptual seeming with 
the kind of non-accidentality necessary for knowledge. Perhaps CORNEA 
fingers a similar requirement: only perceptual experiences that are suit­
ably non-accidental will count as evidence.
Still, it does seem that something like CORNEA is behind our reluc­
tance to accept some metaphorical appearance claims as evidence. But 
as I have shown here, not all metaphorical appearance claims are sub­
ject to CORNEA. If it turns out that defenders of CORNEA can isolate 
the relevant subclass of metaphorical appearances that are subject to the 
CORNEA constraint, then they might still employ CORNEA against the 
noseeum argument from evil by showing that the appearance claim used 
to defend premise (5) is a member of the relevant subclass of metaphori­
cal appearances. Until then, the take-away lesson is just this: CORNEA is 
strong enough to undermine noseeum arguments from evil, but it does so 
only by undermining a great many of our inductive beliefs that we intui­
tively want to hang on to. Accepting CORNEA lands us in an inductive 
skepticism, but abandoning CORNEA means giving up one of the most 
successful responses to noseeum arguments from evil. This is a dilemma 
that all defenders of CORNEA face.29
Fort Lewis College
28Fred Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969),
p. 82.
29Matt McGrath and Philip Swenson provided helpful comments on drafts of 
this paper, and Tom Flint and two anonymous referees for Faith and Philosophy 
provided many (humbling) criticisms and suggestions for improvement. Thanks 
to both Kenny Boyce and Stephen Wykstra with whom I first discussed this objec­
tion at the Baylor Philosophy of Religion Conference in February 2007.
